







Lancaster University Management School 

















The Department of Economics                        
Lancaster University Management School 




©Xiaolan Fu and V N Balasubramanyam  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.co.uk/publications 
LUMS home page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/ 
 
 
   1
Township and Village Enterprises in China 
 
Xiaolan Fu and V. N. Balasubramanyam 
Department of Economics, Lancaster University 
 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have played a significant role in the growth of the 
Chinese economy since the economic reforms of 1978. This paper analyses the productive 
efficiency of a cross section of TVEs in the manufacturing sector, and compares them with 
those for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and major international competitors of TVEs. 
TVEs are found to be much more efficient than comparable SOEs. They are also competitive 
in the international markets. Their management which responds to market forces and their 
outward-orientation have contributed to their productive efficiency. The performance of 
TVEs suggests that efficient management, which successfully exploits the endowments and 
resources of the country rather than the nature of ownership of production entities, is crucial 






Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have played a significant role in the growth of the Chinese 
economy since the economic reforms of 1978. They accounted for 61 percent of total industrial 
output in the year 1999
1 and their annual average real growth rate over the ten-year period 1988-99 
was as high as 19 percent
2. Whilst the literature on the Chinese economy recognises their role in the 
growth process, TVEs have not received the attention they deserve. We know very little about the 
structure and performance of TVEs though they are a major force in China’s growth and 
development. This paper analyses the productive efficiency of TVEs and the sources of their 
efficiency. Various indicators of productive efficiency for a cross section of TVEs in the 
manufacturing sector are estimated and compared with those for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
for some of the major international competitors of TVEs.  
 
Section II of the paper provides a brief review of the development and characteristics of TVEs. 
Section III estimates indicators of productive efficiency for TVEs. Section IV examines the sources 
of efficiency. Section V concludes.  
 
                                                 
1 Estimated from China statistical yearbook, China township and village-owned enterprises statistical yearbook, 2000. 
2 Estimated from China township and village-owned enterprises statistical yearbook, various issues.   2
II.  The Development and Characteristics of TVEs  
 
TVEs are economic units which are either collectively-owned by local residents in the rural areas of 
China or mainly owned and controlled by the peasants
3. The broad concept of TVEs includes, in 
addition to the collectively-owned enterprises, other rural non-state enterprises such as the enterprises 
owned and run by individual peasants (Appendix 1)
4.  The collectively-owned township and village 
enterprises, however, account for two thirds of the output of all TVEs. This paper is confined to these 
TVEs. 
 
Many of the TVEs followed on from the ‘commune- and brigade-run’ enterprises established at the 
time of the Great Leap Forward at the end of 1958. Since the economic reforms in 1978, especially 
the agricultural reforms, TVEs have experienced impressive growth. Their gross output reached 
RMB 7674 billion (US$927 billion) in 1999, accounting for 61 percent of China’s total industrial 
output. The annual growth rate of their output at 1990 prices over the ten-year period 1988-99 was as 
high as 19 percent. They employ a total of 127 million people, accounting for 18 percent of the total 
labour force of the country and 25 percent of the rural labour force. In the year 1999 their exports 
reached US$94 billion, accounting for 48 percent of the country’s total exports. The annual real 
growth rate of their exports over the ten-year period 1988-99 was as high as 28 percent, exceeding 
the growth rate of China’s total exports at around 13 percent over the same period. The composition 
of their exports has shifted over the years from primary and unskilled-labour intensive products 
towards relatively skilled-labour intensive products
5. 
 
TVEs exhibit a number of distinctive characteristics: they are publicly-owned but market oriented; 
they are small in size, enjoy a high degree of autonomy of operations; they are much more outward-
oriented than SOEs; they are subject to hard budget constraints (Table 1). The most significant 
characteristic of TVEs is that though they are publicly owned, they are subject to the discipline of the 
market, yet another attempt by the Chinese at walking on two legs. In general TVEs are the property 
of local residents, but rights of ownership on their behalf is exercised by the town and village 
governments. The profits of TVEs are an important source of local government revenues.  
                                                 
3 Law on Township and Village Enterprises, P.R. China, 1996. 
4 China’s industrial enterprises are subdivided into eight groups based on the nature of ownership: the State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), collectively-owned enterprises, privately-owned enterprises, individually-owned enterprises, jointly-
owned enterprises, share-holding enterprises, foreign-owned  enterprises and other types of enterprises. The major 
component of TVEs is the collectively-owned enterprises (Appendix 1).  
5 Estimated from China statistical yearbook, China township and village-owned enterprises statistical yearbook and China 
foreign economic statistical yearbook, 1999.   3
 
Although they are publicly owned, TVEs are subject to a hard budget constraint. They have very 
limited access to the loans from the formal financial system such as the state-owned banks and the 
Rural Credit Cooperatives (Qian and Roland, 1996). They may go bankrupt when they lose money. 
 
The management of TVEs is executed by the township and village leaders who act as entrepreneurs, 
or by hired managers. Day-to-day management functions have been increasingly devolved to 
professional managers. Managerial remuneration systems of TVEs have evolved over the years, 
changing from the fixed wage contract to profit sharing contract and fixed payment scheme, which is 
essentially a lease agreement.  
 
In the early years, during the decade of the eighties, a fixed wage contract was the preferred method 
of remuneration for the professional managers. These salaried managers had very little autonomy 
over decision-making and the enterprises were virtually run by the leaders. As the TVEs grew in size 
and numbers, the leaders appear to have been hard put to cope with the external managerial functions 
as well as internal management. Profit sharing contracts introduced during the decade of the nineties 
was one attempt at developing a cadre of managers capable of executing internal management 
functions. Profit sharing contracts between the leaders and the professional managers not only freed 
the leaders from internal management tasks, but also ensured that profits of the enterprises were 
preserved. It was the hope that increased autonomy over decision-making and the lure of a share in 
the profits of the enterprise would promote efficient internal management on the part of professional 
managers. Yet another form of contractual agreement is the fixed payment scheme which is 
essentially a lease agreement between the manager and the leader. The manager pays a fixed amount 
of the total profits in the form of a rent to the local government and retains the residual.  This scheme 
also allows managers a considerable degree of autonomy over decision-making.  
 
The remuneration of workers as opposed to managers in most TVEs is tied to performance. Workers 
are mostly paid by piece rates. TVEs are able to acquire high quality engineers because their salaries 
and wage payments methods are tied to performance. TVEs also enjoy a high degree of freedom in 
their management of labour. They can recruit and lay off workers depending on demand conditions 
for their output. The average skill level of employees, however, is relatively low in the TVE sector. 
Most of the workers are from the countryside with little training and skills. 
   4
Many TVEs have positioned their business in areas with severe shortages of output or where SOEs 
have been weak. They have taken advantage of China's endowments of cheap labour and specialised 
in the production of labour or resource-intensive products such as textiles, clothing, food processing, 
and toys. With the gradual opening up of the economy, TVEs have also attracted substantial volumes 
of export-oriented FDI (Table 2).  
 
III.  Productive Efficiency of TVEs 
 
A. Methods of Estimation  
There are three principal approaches to the measurement of productive efficiency: ratio analysis such 
as labour productivity and capital productivity, econometric approach such as the stochastic frontier 
model, and programming approach such as the data envelopment analysis. One of the most popular 
efficiency measures is labour productivity, but it ignores all other inputs save labour. The other 
partial indicators such as capital productivity suffer from similar problem. Cost per unit of output is 
another measure of efficiency. The unit labour cost or the efficiency wage, which is composed of 
wage rate per unit of labour and its productivity, is widely used in empirical studies.  
 
Total factor productivity (TFP) provides a much more comprehensive guide to efficiency than these 
indicators. It takes into account the contribution of factors, other than raw labour and capital, such as 
managerial skills and technical know-how. It is usually defined as a residual, after the contribution of 
labour and capital to output growth has been taken into account. A Solow-type TFP index based on 
the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale is as follows (Good, et al., 
1997),  
                                                        TFP = Y / ) (
1 α α − K L
  
where TFP = total factor productivity, Y= value-added, L = labour, K = capital. At cost-minimizing 
levels of inputs, α denotes the share of labour in total output and 1- α denotes the share of capital in 
total output. However, estimation of TFP is subject to several well-known problems.  
  
The main advantage of the econometric approach is that measurement error can be minimized and 
hypotheses can be tested with statistical rigour. Its main drawback is that the production function is 
assumed to be known. In many empirical studies, the production function across sectors and over 
time periods is assumed to be homogeneous when this may not be the case. 
   5
In the programming approach, ‘the efficiency measure of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) is defined 
by its position relative to the frontier of best performance established mathematically by the ratio of 
weighted sum of outputs to weighted sum of inputs’
6. Graph 1 illustrates the general DEA approach 
developed by Farrell (Farrell, 1957). For example, assume 4 production units which use two inputs to 
produce one output. Plotting input 1 per unit output against input 2 per unit output, the efficiency 
frontier is given by the line joining ABC and extends parallel to the axes beyond A and C. Technical 
efficiency (TE) at point E is calculated as TE = OS/OE. Technical efficiency measures a firm’s 
success in minimizing inputs to produce a given amount of output (input-oriented technical 
efficiency), or its success in producing the maximum of output with a given set of inputs (output-
oriented technical efficiency)(Fare, et al, 1984; Coelli, 1996). 
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For a sample of n firms, if X and Y are the observations on inputs and outputs, assuming variable 
returns to scale, the firm’s efficiency score, θ , is the solution to the linear program problem,  
                     λ θ, Min θ  
                     st.      0 ≥ − λ θ X xi  
                              0 ≥ + − λ Y yi  
                                         0 ≥ i λ             
                                   ∑ =1 i λ             . ,..., 1 n i =  
where θ  is a scalar and λ is a nx1 vector of constants. The efficiency score ranges from 0 to 1. If θ k 
= 1, the kth decision making unit (DMU) is deemed to be technically efficient.  
 
                                                 
6 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978.   6
The strength of the programming approach lies not only in its lack of parameterization, but also in 
that no assumptions are made about the form of the production function. Instead, a best-practice 
function is built empirically from observed inputs and outputs. The main shortcoming of this 
technique is that there is no provision for statistical noise or measurement error in the model. Any 
deviation of an observation from the frontier must be attributed to inefficiency (Greene, 1997; 
Norman and Stoker, 1991).  
 
B. Data and results 
The data we use for efficiency estimation are taken from ‘The third national industrial census of 
China’ for a total number of 179 industry groups for the year 1995. The data for international 
comparison are collected from the ‘International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics’, UNIDO. We 
utilize ratio analysis and data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the productive efficiency of 
TVEs.  
 
In the data envelopment analysis, we use value-added in current prices as the measure of output, net 
fixed assets as the measure of capital
7, and total wage bill as the measure of labour inputs in order to 
capture, to a certain extent, the quality of labour input. Because growth of output has been the major 
objective of Chinese industries in recent years, we concentrate on output-oriented technical efficiency 
under variable returns to scale (VRS)
8. 
 
Estimates of the various indicators of productive efficiency for TVEs at the industry level are 
reported along with comparable estimates for SOEs (Figure 1). All of the estimated indictors attest to 
the superior efficiency of TVEs. In 1995, the average technical efficiency score of TVEs was 85 
percent higher than that for SOEs. Six industries are found to be technically efficient, including 1 
SOE industry and 5 TVE industries. TVEs’ total factor productivity (TFP) was 74 percent higher 
than that for SOEs
9. The estimates of TFP are consistent with those reported in previous studies 
(Svejnar, 1990; Jefferson et al, 1992; Woo et al, 1993; Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Zheng, et al, 1998). 
All the other indicators including capital productivity, labour productivity and social efficiency index 
                                                 
7 Because non-production capital such as housing and health care facilities can be regarded as part of the incentive 
scheme for the employees which can attract high quality personnel and promote work efficiency, we do not separate it 
from the total capital input. 
8 According to Zheng et al (1997) and Avkiran (2001), results under variable returns to scale is usually preferred when the 
estimation under constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale differ. Thus in this study we report mainly 
estimation results under variable returns to scale (VRS). 
9 Following Bernard (1999), assuming the production function across industries is homogeneous, we estimate the 
coefficients of a Cobb-Douglas type production function of value added on capital and labour for TVEs to obtain the 
share for labour (α). The estimated share of labour in TVE sector for the year 1995 is 0.39.   7
also attest to the relative superior efficiency of TVEs. The statistical tests for paired samples show 
that the mean of the two sectors are significantly different from each other for all the indicators
10. 




The unit labour costs of China’s TVEs in principal export industries, such as textile, apparel, leather 
product and footwear industry, are also lower than that in comparable industries in Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand and India, her major competitors in world markets. This is either because her 
wage rates are relatively low or because her labour productivity is higher 
12(Figure 2). International 
comparison of technical efficiency also indicates that, in comparable industries, China’s TVEs are 
efficient relative to other major developing country suppliers in the world market
13 (Figure 3). In the 
case of textile industry, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia and TVEs are on the frontier, which indicates they 
are efficient relative to other competitors such as India, Philippines, Thailand, Korea and Mexico.  In 
the case of the leather product industry, TVEs lie on the frontier together with Thailand, Chile, 
Indonesia, Turkey and India. They are much more efficient than Philippines, Korea, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Electrical machinery is an item of exports on the comparative advantage ladder which China 
is trying to move up to. Here Brazil, Korea and Indonesia form the efficiency frontier. TVEs are less 
efficient than firms in these countries, but they are as efficient as Thailand and more efficient than 
firms in Mexico, Philippines, India and Malaysia.  In sum, TVEs are not only much more efficient 
than comparable SOEs, they are also, in general, more efficient in comparison with their major 
international competitors in the principal export industries.   
 
IV.  Sources of efficiency 
 
What are the sources of productive efficiency of TVEs? Their exposure to international markets 
through trade and FDI could be a principal factor in their observed superior productive efficiency 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Egan and Mody, 1992; Balasubramnayam, et al, 1996; Clerides, 
                                                 
10 The statistical test for paired samples tests the null hypothesis that the means of SOE and TVE samples are equal. The 
probabilities associated with t-test are all 0.00 for every indicator.   
11 Of the total 18 industry groups, TVEs exhibit much better performance except in the alcohol and tobacco industry 
which is rigidly controlled by the state. In the leather product industry TVEs have the largest efficiency advantage over 
the SOEs in terms of technical efficiency and labour productivity; while the largest gap lies in the machinery equipment 
manufacturing industry in terms of total factor productivity and capital productivity.   
12 Production of these industries in Thailand and Philippines are more capital-intensive than that in China’s TVEs. The 
higher labour productivity of these two countries in these industries may be, to a certain extent, attributed to the higher 
capital-labour ratio in their production. 
13 Because the technical efficiencies of TVEs in these industries are higher than those of China as a whole, in order to 
keep data comparable, we use the data on China from UNIDO for the corresponding industries of TVEs.       8
1998). It could, however, be argued that it is only the relatively efficient firms which enter the world 
markets. The causation is from efficiency to exports and not the other way round (Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1996; Yamada, 1998; Bernard and Jensen 1999; and Aw et al, 2000). Whilst there is no 
firm statistical evidence to support either of these contentions, the fact remains that exposure of 
TVEs to international competition has been to their advantage. In addition, the sizable volumes of 
FDI that TVEs have attracted may also serve as efficient conduits for the transmission of technology 
and managerial know-how.  
 
Several other factors besides their outward-orientation could be conjectured to have played a role in 
the observed superior productive efficiency of TVEs. We discuss some of these factors prior to 
subjecting them to a rigorous statistical test. 
 
Management is one of the major factors which contributes to productive efficiency. Efficient 
management serves to minimise costs of production, reduce transaction costs within firms, improves 
product quality and efficient utilisation of resources. However, when managers are not responsible 
for the consequences of their actions, with wages predetermined, there are opportunities for free-
riding, the degree of X-inefficiency increases (Leibenstein, 1978). Performance related payments to 
managers, frequently observed in the TVEs, might be one method of reducing X-inefficiency. The 
incorporation of accountability through a hard-budget constraint, performance payment schemes for 
managers and piece rate payments for workers promote X-efficiency in the TVE sector.  
 
Increased autonomy over managerial decision-making and a stake in the firm’s profits may also 
contribute to efficient operations. Usually the larger the fraction of the total profits the enterprise is 
allowed to retain, the stronger will be the motivation to improve productive efficiency on the part of 
managers. A high degree of autonomy over decision-making is accorded to managers in most TVEs.  
 
The nature of ownership of firms could also impact on productive efficiency of firms. The property 
rights model suggests that public ownership attenuates property rights, reduces incentives to 
minimize costs and encourages free-riding. Agency theory, however, suggests that when ownership is 
separated from management, the objectives of managers and owners may diverge. Individuals in the 
firm will not minimise costs for a given level of output. Such principal-agent relationship is regarded 
as an important source of X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1975; Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). A 
number of empirical studies have investigated the comparative efficiency of different ownership   9
structures, but no strong evidence has been provided in favour of one system or the other (Byrnes et 
al, 1986; Ferrier, 1993).   
 
TVEs in China, however, fit none of the commonly observed patterns of ownership and management. 
TVEs are nominally owned by the local residents, but controlled, managed and supported by the local 
governments and they respond to market forces. Their ownership is similar to SOEs to the extent that 
they are all publicly owned. Such public ownership may provide some institutional advantages over 
private firms in solving the agency problem (Bowles and Dong, 1996). Also, the assignment of 
property rights to the local government may be an efficient response to Chinese institutional 
constraints (Chang and Wang, 1994). Weitzman and Xu (1994) also argue that the demographic 
stability of China’s rural communities and the Confucian tradition have promoted the emergence of a 
cooperative culture which renders well defined private property rights unnecessary for the promotion 
of entrepreneurial activity and productivity
14. 
 
Although they are both publicly-owned, the management style of TVEs is considerably different 
from that of SOEs. TVEs are subject to the discipline of the market. The incorporation of 
accountability and exposure of publicly owned firms to market forces compels TVEs to minimise 
costs and maximise efficiency. Loss making enterprises are not bailed out by the state nor or they 
allowed to cream off all the profits they make. Whilst loss making firms go bankrupt, the successful 
ones share their profits with the local governments. The so-called agency problem is greatly reduced 
in the case of these contractual arrangements as managers’ fortunes depend upon the efficiency with 
which they manage the enterprises. The unique combination of public ownership with market-
orientated management of TVEs may have helped them overcome both the moral hazard and agency 
problems. The market environment in which the enterprises operate motivates entrepreneurship, 
allows managers to experiment and innovate, but it also holds them accountable for their actions. It is 
for these reasons that TVEs are not only much more efficient than the SOEs, they are also as 
productive as those firms which are owned privately (Pitt and Putterman, 1992; Dong and Putterman, 
1997).  
   
In sum, outward orientation, efficient management and the unique combination of public ownership 
with market-oriented management are factors which may have contributed to the productive 
                                                 
14 Weitzman and Xu, 1994. For an excellent discussion on productivity and ownership structure, see Dong and Putterman, 
1997, Zheng, Liu and Bigsten, 1998.   
   10
efficiency of TVEs. The influence of these and other factors on the observed productive efficiency of 
TVEs is analysed below in the context of a statistical model. 
 
A. Model 
We employ regression analysis to estimate the impact of the factors discussed earlier on the 
productive efficiency of TVEs. The equation to be estimated in logarithms is of the following form: 
 














LPE 6 5 4 3 2 1       (1)      
 
where i = 1, …, N indexes industry, PE = productive efficiency, EX = outward orientation, MS = 
management intensity, WS = workforce skills, FS = firm size, KI = capital intensity, DO = sector 
dummy, 1 for TVEs and 0 for SOEs. Two alternative measures of productive efficiency, labour 
productivity (VAL) and technical efficiency (TE), are regressed upon the independent variables listed 
above respectively. 
 
In the estimation of technical efficiency, the efficiency scores have an upper bound of 1.0 and a lower 
bound of 0.0, the ordinary least squares estimates would be inconsistent. Therefore, the regression 
model for technical efficiency is specified in form of the Tobit model as follows (Tobin, 1958; 
Greene, 1990; Zheng, 1997). 
 
 where Xi is a vector of independent variables as listed in equation (1). 
 
B. Data and Methodology 
The main data set relates to a pooled sample of 358 industries including 177 TVE industries and 177 
comparable SOE industries for the year 1995. It is derived from ‘the Data of The Third National 
Industrial Census of P.R.China’. The second set of data relates to panel data for TVEs in 29 
provinces of China over the time period 1987-1998. These are collected from the ‘China township 
and village enterprises yearbook’ and the ‘China agricultural statistical yearbook’. This data set 
covers most of the TVEs during their period of rapid growth. It not only provides us with a base to 
investigate the dynamic effects of the determinants on efficiency, but also takes the regional 
µ β α + + i LX   if  µ β α + + i LX < 0 
   = LPE  
(2) 
0                     otherwise   11
dimension into account. A more detailed description of the sources of data and the measurement of 
variables is given in Appendix 2.  
 
The statistical test is in three steps. First, we estimate regression equations (1) and (2) with the pooled 
data set for SOEs and TVEs. The explanatory variables include ourward-orientation and management 
intensity. Labour skills, firm size, capital intensity and a sector dummy DO, which equals to 1 for 
TVEs and 0 for SOEs, are used as control variables. Because of possible endogeneity between 
openness and productive efficiency, we first apply Wu-Hausman specification test to test for 
endogeneity. Management intensity (MS), workforce skills (WS), capital intensity (KI), firm size 
(FS), market size (MARKS), comparative advantage
15 (CA), and policy dummy (DI) are used as 
predetermined variables. If endogeneity is detected between openness and productive efficiency, we 
utilise the 2-stage least square (2SLS) for labour productivity estimation and 2-stage Tobit model for 
technical efficiency estimation, otherwise we use the OLS and normal Tobit model. 
  
Secondly, we test for the effects of outward orientation, management and other factors on the 
productive efficiency of TVEs and SOEs separately, and investigate the major factors which 
determine the efficiency gap between the two groups. We test for the structural differences between 
the two productivity equations by applying the Wald test of restrictions imposed on parameters. The 
‘seemingly unrelated’ equations are as follows: 
 
          t t LKI t LFS t LWS t LMS t LEX t t LPE µ γ γ γ γ γ α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1               (3)                                                                      
         s s LKI s LFS s LWS s LMS s LEX s s LPE µ δ δ δ δ δ α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1              (4)                                                                      
 
where t and s denote TVEs and SOEs, respectively. 
 
We first compare the estimated coefficients for corresponding variables in the two equations, for 
example,  1 γ and  1 δ ; then we employ a Wald test to test the null hypothesis  1 γ =  1 δ . As there may be 
endogeneity between exports and productivity, a Hausman test is also applied. If there is endogeneity 
                                                 





ij wj ij X X X X RCA ) / /( ) / ( , where i is the country, j is the commodity and w is the world. Detailed information of 
the measurement of predetermined variables and sources of the data is given in Appendix 2.  
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between exports and productivity, we apply the 3SLS to the equation system; otherwise, we utilise 
the SURE method.  
 
Finally, we estimate equation (1), with the panel data set, to test for the dynamic effects of outward-
orientation and management on the productive efficiency of TVEs when regional specific 
characteristics are controlled for.  
 
C. Cross-section Results 
Table 4 reports the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results for the pooled data set using 
labour productivity as the dependent variable
16.  The coefficients of outward-orientation (EX) and 
management intensity (MS) are positive and statistically significant suggesting a positive 
contribution of outward orientation and management to productive efficiency.  Workforce skills, firm 
size and capital intensity variables also bear the expected significant positive coefficients. Results for 
the equation based on technical efficiency as the dependent variable are similar to that for labour 
productivity.  
 
Table 5 presents the results for the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation of labour productivity 
of TVEs and SOEs
17. Outward-orientation (EX) exerts a significant positive effect on the 
productivity of TVEs, while it is insignificant in the case of the SOE sector. The Wald statistic at 
8.828 suggests that the estimated coefficient of outward-orientation variable in the TVE equation is 
significantly different from that in the SOE equation at the 1% significance level (Table 6) indicating 
the significant contribution of outward-orientation to the superior productive efficiency of TVEs.  
 
Management intensity (MS) is positively correlated with productive efficiency in the TVE sector and 
the coefficient of management intensity (MS) variable is statistically significant. A one percent 
increase in bonuses per employee is to increase labour productivity of TVEs by 0.18 percent. But 
they are insignificant in the SOE equation. The Wald test indicates that the difference between the 
two coefficients is statistically significant. This fact suggests that, in the TVE sector, market-oriented 
                                                 
16 The t-statistic of –3.70 for exports-residual in the labour productivity (VAL) equation and –3.55 in the technical 
efficiency (TE) equation suggest that there is significant endogeneity between exports and productive efficiency in the 
sample. Therefore we utilize the 2-Stage Least Square (2SLS) for labour productivity (VAL) equation and 2-Stage Tobit 
model for technical efficiency (TE) equation. The White heteroscedasticity statistics (cross term) suggest the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. Thus, we adopt White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates for the standard errors and t-ratios.      
17 When the 3SLS estimates are compared with those for the seemingly unrelated regression, Hausman specification test 
statistics (χ
2) which are as high as 918 strongly suggest the endogeneity between exports and productive efficiency.     13
management such as incentive schemes have played a significant role in the promotion of X-
efficiency. 
 
Workforce skills (WS) variable exerts a positive impact on productivity in both the TVE and the SOE 
sectors. But the magnitude of the coefficient of the workforce skills variable in the SOE equation at 
0.599 is considerably higher than that in the TVE equation. The Wald statistic indicates that this 
difference is significant. It is likely production workers in the SOE sector are better trained than those 
in the TVE sector. The coefficients of capital intensity (KI) variable tell the same story. This suggests 
that capital intensity in the SOE sector plays an important role in determining its productivity mostly 
because of the recent vintages of technology embodied in capital goods in use in the sector. 
 
The coefficients of the firm size (FS) variable in both equations are significantly positive, and the 
Wald statistic shows the difference between them is statistically insignificant. This suggests that, 
irrespective of the ownership structure the firm adopts, productivity and size are related. The test on 
the determinants of technical efficiency in the two sectors also lends evidence supporting the positive 
contribution of outward-orientation and management to the superior productive efficiency of TVEs 
(Table 7).  
 
D. Panel Data Results 
Results using the panel data set are presented in Table 8
18. Again, outward-orientation (EX) exhibits 
a significant positive impact on the productive efficiency of TVEs. According to the estimation 
result, a one percent increase in openness increases productive efficiency by about 0.15 percent. 
Bonuses per employee (MS1) and retained profits per employee (MS2) are positively associated with 
productivity and are statistically significant. This suggests the increases in incentives and autonomy 
promote productive efficiency in the TVE sector.  The coefficients of the coastal region dummy 
variable are positive but are not significant in either equation. This suggests that, when openness, 
management, capital intensity and technological progress have all been controlled for, the efficiency 
gap between TVEs in the coastal and the interior regions is not significant. 
 
                                                 
18 In this case, we use bonuses per employee and retained profits per employee as measures of management intensity 
alternatively. Exports as a proxy of outward-orientation, a time trend capturing the technological change, and a coastal 
region dummy which equals to 1 for coastal regions and 0 for inland regions are also included as the explanatory 
variables. Because of potential endogeneity between exports and productivity, we use 2-stage-least-squares (2SLS) for 
estimation. The instruments we use are exports and productivity lagged by one year.              14
V. Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of the paper can be briefly summarised. TVEs have made a major contribution to 
growth and exports of China. Most of the indicators of productive efficiency suggest that TVEs are 
much more efficient than comparable SOEs. They are also competitive in the international markets. 
The unique pattern of their ownership, their management which responds to market forces and their 
outward-orientation all appear to have contributed to their productive efficiency.  
 
China’s TVEs appear to have successfully combined public ownership of industry with management 
which responds to market based incentives. Their performance suggests that efficient management, 
which successfully exploits the endowments and resources of the country rather than the nature of 
ownership of production entities, is crucial to the success of manufacturing firms.  
 
   15
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 Table  2    Major Exporting Industries of TVEs, 1995 
 
Industry   Export-output 
ratio 





Toy manufacturing  0.70  579  0.54 
Computer man.  0.65  193  0.54 
Apparel man.  0.54  3146  0.36 
Sport articles man.  0.54  100  0.39 
Leather product man.  0.52  1320  0.41 
Watch &  Clock man  0.51  91  0.55 
Other electric equipment  0.50  63  0.73 
Feather product man.  0.47  243  0.28 
Hat manufacturing  0.46  29  0.33 
Electronic appliance man  0.44  93  0.67 
Knitted product man.  0.41  833  0.33 
Footwear man.  0.39  170  0.32 
Plastic shoes man.  0.39  61  0.44 
Office machines man.  0.36  13  0.40 
Electronic parts man.  0.34  276  0.44 
Textile 0.22  4484  0.17 
                 Source: Calculated from ‘The Third National Industrial Census of P.R.China’, 1995. 
 
Table 3   Performance of TVEs, sectoral analysis, 1995 
                                                                                                                      SOE=1.00 
Industry



















Machinery equipment  2  3.28 9.53  1.92  0.85  0.32  0.70 
Leather  3.81  2.93  3.56  3.25  1.30 1.00 0.79 
Transportation  2.39  2.70  6.22  1.62  0.64 0.15 0.63 
Textile 2.47  1.93 2.25  2.16  0.97  0.43  0.93 
Food  2.69  1.92  2.46  1.83  0.84 0.38 0.76 
Plastic product  2.43  1.85 2.11  2.70  1.34  0.63  1.27 
Mining  2.03  1.85  3.45  1.36  0.79 0.19 0.42 
Electric machinery  2.25  1.80 2.12  2.09  0.89  0.53  1.04 
Apparel  2.14  1.73  2.22  1.81  1.24 1.00 0.81 
Chemical 2.42  1.73 2.31  1.43  0.71  0.19  0.62 
Drug 1.64  1.69 2.10  1.70  0.71  0.48  0.89 
Non-metal 2.41  1.63 2.23  1.86  1.02  0.36  0.94 
Instruments and office machinery  2.16  1.59  1.81  1.90  0.80  0.50  0.82 
Fibre & Rubber  2.33  1.57 1.87  1.74  0.83  0.25  0.99 
Metal 1.95  1.54 1.92  1.87  0.94  0.09  0.94 
Electronic and telecom  1.54  1.38 1.47  1.67  0.97  0.54  0.90 
Miscel light industry   1.63  1.35 1.84  1.04  0.85  0.17  0.64 
Alcohol & tobacco  1  0.61 1.03  0.35  0.66  0.05  0.50 
Note: 1. The industries listed here are the major industry groups each consisting of several sub-industries.    19
Source: Calculated from ‘The Third National Industrial Census of P.R.China’, 1995. 
                  
               Table 4     Estimation results of determinants of productive efficiency for pooled data  
Efficiency measures 
Labour productivity  Technical efficiency 
Independent Variable  OLS 2SLS  TOBIT  2S-TOBIT 
CONS  3.578*** 3.829***  -2.066***  -1.876*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DO  1.356*** 1.560***  1.411***  1.563*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LEX  0.029*** 0.076***  0.013  0.047*** 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.112)  (0.000) 
LSM  0.157*** 0.173***  0.128***  0.139*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LWS  0.123*** 0.178***  0.121***  0.160*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LFS  0.074*** 0.114*** 0.035** 0.064*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.000) 
LKI  0.366*** 0.290***  -0.170*** -0.225 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of observations 358  358  358  358 
Adjusted R
2 0.546  0.505    
Log likelihood      -137.054  -129.54 
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       Table 5    Estimates of labour productivity of TVE and SOE sectors  
3SLS SURE  Independent 
Variable  TVE SOE  TVE  SOE 
Intercept  6.337*** -1.381  6.221***  -1.393 
  (0.000) (0.122)  (0.000)  (0.118) 
LEX  0.041*** -0.012  0.026***  -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.317)  (0.006)  (0.869) 
LMS  0.180*** -0.007  0.180***  -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.851)  (0.000)  (0.963) 
LWS  0.102*** 0.599***  0.082***  0.602*** 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
LFS  0.046** 0.074***  0.033**  0.075*** 
  (0.012) (0.000)  (0.042)  (0.000) 
LKI  0.212*** 0.609***  0.232***  0.603*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
N  179 179  179  179 
Note: * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; *** Significant at the 1 percent level;     




Table 6   Wald Tests of Equality of estimated coefficients between TVE and SOE equations 
 
Variables  Null Hypothesis  Wald Statistic  Reject Null (1%) 
Intercept  αt=βs  64.440*** Yes 
LEX  γ1=δ1  8.828*** Yes 
LMS  γ2=δ2  13.638*** Yes 
LWS  γ3=δ3  22.730*** Yes 
LFS  γ4=δ4  1.111 No 
LKI  γ5=δ5  34.659*** Yes 
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             Table 7    Estimates of technical efficiency in TVE and SOE sectors  
2S-TOBIT TOBIT 
Independent 
Variables  TVE SOE TVE SOE 
C  0.501 -2.257** 0.236 -2.258** 
  (0.157) (0.020) (0.504) (0.020) 
LEX  0.028** 0.005  0.010  -0.001 
  (0.040) (0.693) (0.304) (0.940) 
LSM  0.166*** 0.117*** 0.167*** 0.115*** 
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) 
LWS  0.113*** 0.145 0.087*** 0.143 
  (0.000) (0.182) (0.001) (0.188) 
LFS  0.014 0.004 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.447) (0.869) (0.937) (0.886) 
LKI  -0.309*** -0.166*** -0.283*** -0.163*** 
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.008) 
N  179 179 179 179 
            Note:  * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; *** Significant at the 1 percent 





                   Table 8       Determinants of productive efficiency: panel data results 
Independent variables  (1)  (2) 
C  0.547* 1.716*** 
  (0.077) (0.000) 
LEX  0.157** 0.136*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) 
LMS1  0.108***  
  (0.010)   
LMS2   0.340*** 
    (0.000) 
LKL  0.134 0.320*** 
  (0.252) (0.000) 
T  0.099*** 0.022** 
  (0.000) (0.013) 
DC  0.103 0.042 
  (0.394) (0.203) 
N  87 145 
Adjusted R
2 0.898  0.973 
Note: Regression equation LPEit=κ+θLEXit+ξLMSit+ηDCit+ T υ +εit, where PE = labour productivity, EX = 
real exports per employee, MS = management intensity measured by real bonuses  per employee (MS1), and real 
retained profits per employee (MS2) alternatively, T = the time trend, and DC = coastal region dummy variable 
which equals 1 for coastal regions and 0 for non-coastal regions. Instrumental variables are: EX and PE lagged 
by one year. Regression (1) and (2) cover the time period of 1995-1998 and 1987-1992 respectively.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. p-
values are in parentheses.  




            Note: 1.The figures here are the unweighted average of each indicator of TVE and SOE sectors respectively.  
      Source: Calculated from ‘The Third National Industrial Census of P.R.China’, 1995.   
 
Figure 2         International comparison of unit wage costs 
 
Note:  1. The data of TVEs and Indonesia are for the year 1998, Philippines 1997, Thailand 1994 and India 1999.  
2. Labour productivity of TVEs in industry I = (UNIDO value-added per employee of China in industry I)* (The 
ratio of value-added per employee of TVEs in industry I to that of the whole country of China in the same 
industry);  Wage rate of TVEs in industry I = (TVEs wage rate in industry I in 1995)* (growth rate of 
manufacturing wage rate in China over 1998-1995) 
Figure 1. Comparative Performance of TVEs and SOEs, 1995












































































Unit labour cost Labour Productivity Wage rate  23
Source: UNIDO Country Industrial Statistics; China statistical yearbook, 1999; The data of the third national 
industrial census of the P.R.China, 1995. 
 




Note: BR=Brazil, TVE=China’ TVEs, HK=Hong Kong SAR, TW=Taiwan province, IND=India, IDN=Indonesia, 
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HK TW  24
Source: UNIDO, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1999; The data of the third national industrial census of 
the P.R.China, 1995. 
 
 
        Appendix 1        Ownership structure of Chinese enterprises, 1995 
 
Gross industrial output  Sector 
 
 
Value    
100million yuan 
Percentage of total 
% 
Total 80519  100 
State-owned enterprises  25890  0.32 
Collective-owned enterprises  28541  0.35 
Private-owned enterprises  2334  0.03 
Individual-owned enterprises  9632  0.12 
Joint-owned enterprises  652  0.01 
Share-holding enterprises  2727  0.03 
Foreign invested enterprises  10660  0.13 
Others 78  0.00 
    
Of which     
    Township and village-owned enterprises  36257  0.45 
        Of which     
            Township-owned enterprises  11682  0.15 
            Village-owned enterprises  11906  0.15 
            Rural joint/cooperative enterprises  1631  0.02 
            Rural private-owned enterprises  2295  0.03 
            Rural individual-owned enterprises  8742  0.11 
            Source: The third national industrial census of China, 1995 
 
                 
 
 Appendix 2.     Data Sources and Variable Measurement 
 
This study employs two data sets. One is a cross-industrial data set combined data derived from 
‘The Third National Industrial Census of P.R.China’ 1995, various issues of ‘International 
Yearbook of Industrial Statistics’, UNIDO and ‘International Trade Statistical Yearbook’, UN. 
The other is a panel of data for TVEs across 29 provinces over the time period 1987-1998 
collected from the ‘China township and village enterprises yearbook’ and the ‘China agricultural 
statistical yearbook’. Tibet, Congqing and Hainan are omitted because of incomplete data. The 
measurement of variables use in the study in given below. 
    25
PE = productive efficiency. In this study we regress two measures of efficiency respectively: the 
labour productivity (VAL) measured by value-added per employee and technical efficiency 
(TE) which obtained by data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
EX = outward-orientation, measured by export value of the industry; 
MS = management intensity, measured by bonuses per employee. In the case of the panel data set, it 
is measured by bonuses per employee and retained profits per employee alternatively. 
Bonuses of TVEs in the cross-industry data set equals to profits payable times the ratio of 
bonuses to profits payable estimated from the ‘Statistical yearbook of township and village 
enterprises’, 1995.  
WS = workforce skills, measured by payment by piece rate per production worker; 
FS = firm size, measured by average output per firm in industry i to total output of industry i; 
KI = capital intensity, measured by capital-labour ratio; 
DO = sector dummy, 1 for TVEs and 0 for SOEs; 
MARKS = market size, measured by total output of the industry;  
CA = comparative advantage,  measured by estimated revealed comparative advantage index 
developed by Balassa (1965); the data are collected from United Nation’s ‘International 
Trade Statistical Yearbook’ at three digit level.  
PI = policy dummy, which equals to 1 for the industries which are favoured by government export-




               Appendix  3    Rank correlation matrix of efficiency scores 






TE 1         
TFP 0.824  1.000         
VAD/K 0.572  0.406  1       
VAD/L  0.565 0.544 0.084  1.000     
Social efficiency index  0.795  0.806  0.264  0.584  1.000   
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